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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects on the implementation of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 (“Act”) on US telecommunications markets and is based on my forthcoming book
with the same title.  The Act is a milestone in the history of telecommunications in the
United States.  Coming 12 years after the breakup of AT&T, the Act attempts to move all
telecommunications markets toward competition.  The Act envisions competition in all
telecommunications markets, both in the markets for the various elements that comprise
the telecommunications network, as well as for the final services the network creates.
Building on the experience of the long distance market, which was transformed from a
monopoly to an effectively competitive market over the last 12 years, the Act attempts to
promote competition in the hitherto monopolized local exchange markets.  The Act
recognizes the telecommunications network as a network of interconnected networks.
Telecommunications providers are required to interconnect with entrants at any feasible
point the entrant wishes.  Mo t importantly, the Act requires that incumbent local
exchange carriers (“ILECs”) (i) lease parts of their network (unbundled network elements)
to competitors “at cost”; (ii) provide at a wholesale discount to competitors any service
the ILEC provides; and (iii) charge reciprocal rates in termination of calls to their network
and to networks of local competitors.  Moreover, the Act requires that ILECs that came
out of the Bell System meet a number of requirements, including a public interest test,
before they may enter into the long distance market.  Thus, the Act provides some
safeguards against the export of ILEC monopoly power to other parts of  t  network.
Numerous legal challenges to the Act and its implementation have been raised by the
ILECs resulting in very slow implementation of the Act, and, in many cases, in no
substantial implementation of the provisions of the Act.  Thus, more than two years after
the passage of the Act, there is very little entry and competition in local exchange markets.
In response to the apparent failure of the implementation Act, there has been a wave of
mergers in the US telecommunications industry.
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The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its Impact
1. Introduction
The telecommunications sector has witnessed dramatic reductions in costs in (i)
transmission, using fiberoptic technology; (ii) switching and information processing
because of reductions of costs of integrated circuits and computers.  Cost reductions have
made feasible many data- and transmission-intensive services.
Cost reductions usually allow for entry of more competitors and intensification of
competition.  However, in telecommunications, consumers have not reaped the full
benefits of cost reductions and intensification of competition because of an antiquated
regulatory framework that, ironically, was created to protect consumers from
monopolistic abuses.
The telecommunications sector has witnessed progressive deregulation. The
AT&T breakup (Modification of Final Judgement, “MFJ”) in 1984 resulted in competition
in manufacturing, long distance,1 d information services, while it kept the regime of
regulated monopoly in local telephony.
The direct effect of the breakup of AT&T was competition in long distance.
AT&T’s share in long distance is presently at about 50%.  At the same time,
unexpectedly, local telephone companies (Local Exchange Companies, “LECs”) have
realized significant profits.
In parallel, wireless telephony grew to great success.  The “world wid web”
emerged as a ubiquitous network “living” on top of the telephone network.  Cable
                                         
1 Local exchange carriers that came from the Bell System (AT&T), Regional Bell Operating
Companies (“RBOCs”), were not allowed to compete in the long distance market under the MFJ.
2television achieved high penetration.  New (and cheaper) wireless services (Personal
Communications Services “PCS”) and direct satellite broadcast are reaching the market.
2. Goals of the Act
With this background, President Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act of
1996 (“Act” or “1996 Act”) into law in February 1996.  This was the first major reform
since the original 1934 Telecommunications Act.  The Telecommunications Act of 1996
attempts a major restructuring of the US telecommunications sector.
The 1996 Act crystallized changes that had become necessary because of
technological progress.  Rapid technological change has always been the original cause of
regulatory change.  The radical transformation of the regulatory environment and market
conditions that is presently taking place as a result of the 1996 Act is no exception.
The Act will be judged favorably to the extent that it allows and facilitates the
acquisition by consumers of the benefits of technological advances.  Such a function
requires the promotion of competition in all markets.  This does not mean immediate and
complete deregulation.  Consumers must be protected from monopolistic abuses in some
markets as long as such abuses are feasible under the current market structure.  Moreover,
the regulatory framework must safeguard against firms leveraging their monopoly power
in other markets.
In passing the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“1996 Act”) Congress took
radical steps to restructure U.S. telecommunications markets.  These steps may result in
very significant benefits to consumers of telecommunications services, telecommunications
                                                                                                                   
3carriers, and telecommunications equipment manufacturers.  But the degree of success of
the 1996 Act depends crucially on its implementation through decisions of the Federal
Communication Commission and State Public Utility Commissions as well as the
outcomes of the various court challenges that these decisions, and the Act itself, face.
The 1996 Act envisions a network of interconnected networks that are composed
of complementary components and generally provide both competing and complementary
services.  The 1996 Act uses both tructural and behavioral instruments to accomplish its
goals.  The Act attempts to reduce regulatory barriers to entry and competition.  It
outlaws artificial barriers to entry in local exchange markets, in its attempt to accomplish
the maximum possible competition.  Moreover, it mandates interconnection of
telecommunications networks, unbundling, non-discrimination, and cost-based pricing of
leased parts of the network, so that competitors can enter easily and compete component
by component as well as service by service.
The 1996 Act imposes conditions to ensure that de facto monopoly power is not
exported to vertically-related (complementary) markets.  Thus, the Act requires that
competition be established in local markets befor the incumbent local exchange carriers
are allowed in long distance service.
The Act preserves subsidized local service to achieve “Universal Service,” that is,
the provision of basic local service to the widest possible number of customers.  However,
the Act imposes the requirement that subsidization is transparent and that subsidies are
4raised in a competitively neutral manner.  Thus, the Act leads the way to the elimination of
subsidization of Universal Service through the traditional method of high access charges.2
A potential drawback of the Act is that it does not provide for penalties for non-
compliance.  It rather relies on the firms’ own incentives to drive them to choose
according to what the Act expects.  In this respect, the Act may have underestimated the
ability of incumbents to stall the implementation process of the Act.  Moreover, the Act
definitely overestimated the importance of ILECs’ long distance entry as an incentive for
ILECs to open their local markets to competition.  In the last two years, without
exception, the ILECs chose to forego long distance entry and rather continue to receive
local service monopoly profits.
3. History
Telecommunications has traditionally been a regulated sector of the US economy.
Regulation was imposed in the early part of this century and remains until today in various
parts of the sector.3  The main idea behind regulation was that it was necessary because
the market for telecommunications services was a natural monopoly, and therefore a
second competitor would not survive.  Regulation was imposed to protect consumers
from monopolistic abuses.
                                         
2 Origination and termination access charges are paid by long distance companies to local
exchange carriers for originating or terminating long distance calls to LEC customers.  Access charges
have been set at high levels purportedly to subsidize Universal Service.
3 The telecommunications sector is regulated both by the Federal Government through the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) and by all States, typically through a Public Utilities Commission
(“PUC”) or Public Service Commission.  Usually a PUC also regulates electricity companies.
5As early as 1900, it was clear that all telecommunications markets were not natural
monopolies, as evidenced from the existence of more than one competing firms in many
regional markets, prior to the absorption of most of them in the Bell System.4  Ov r time,
it became clear that some markets were not natural monopolies any more, and that it was
better to allow competition in those markets while keeping the rest regulated.
The market for telecommunication services and for telecommunications equipment
went through various stages of competitiveness since the invention of the telephone by
Alexander Graham Bell.  After a period of expansion and consolidation, by the 1920,
AT&T had an overwhelming majority of telephony exchanges and submitted to State
regulation.  Federal regulation was instituted by the 1934 Telecommunication Act which
established the Federal Communications Commission.
Regulation of the U.S. telecommunications market was marked by two important
antitrust lawsuits that the U.S. Department of Justice brought against AT&T.  In the first
one, United States v. Western Electric, filed in 1949, the U.S. Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) claimed that the Bell Operating Companies practiced illegal exclusion by buying
only from Western Electric, a part of the Bell System.  The government sought a
divestiture of Western Electric.  The case was settled in 1956 with AT&T agreeing not to
enter the computer market, but retaining ownership of Western Electric.
The second major antitrust suit, United States v. AT&T, was started in 1974.  The
government alleged that (i) AT&T’s relationship with Western Electric was illegal, and
(ii) that AT&T monopolized the long distance market.  The DOJ sought divestiture of
both manufacturing and long distance from local service.  The case was settled by the
                                         
4 See Gabel and Weiman (1994) and Mueller (1997).
6Modified Final Judgement (“MFJ”).  This decree broke away from AT&T seven  regional
operating companies (“RBOCs”).  Each RBOC was comprised of a collection of local
telephone companies that were part of AT&T before the breakup.  Regional Bell
Operating Companies remained regulated monopolies, each with an exclusive franchise in
its region.
Microwave transmission was a major breakthrough in long distance transmission
that created the possibility of competition in long distance. The breakup of AT&T
crystallized the belief that competition was possible in long distance, while the local
market remained a natural monopoly.  The biggest benefits to consumers during the last
fifteen years have come from the long distance market, which, during this period was
transformed from a monopoly to an effectively competitive market.
Competition in long distance has been a great success.  The market shar (in
minutes of use) of AT&T fell from 85% to 53% at the end of 1996, as seen in Figure 1.5
Since the MFJ, the number of competitors in the long distance market has increased
dramatically.  There are five large facilities-based competitors, AT&T, MCI, Sprint,
LDDS-Worldcom, and Frontier.6  There is also a large number of “resellers” that buy
wholesale service from the facilities-based long distance carriers and sell to consumers.
For example, currently, there are about 500 resellers competing in the California
interexchange market, providing very strong evidence for the ease of entry into this
                                         
5 Source: FCC (1996).
6 These will be limited to four if the merger of MCI and WORLDCOM is approved by regulators
and antitrust authorities.  Frontier is the new name of Rochester Telephone.  In mid 1998 Qwest entered
the long distance market as a facilities-based competitor with a nationwide network.  Level 3 and others
have recently constructed fiberoptic networks and are expected to enter the long distance (data and voice)
7market.  At least 20 new firms entered the California market in each year since 1984.  At
present, there are at least 5 “out of region” RBOCs providing service in California through
affiliates.  In California, a typical consumer can choose from at least 150 long distance
companies.
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Figure 1
Prices of long distance phone calls have decreased dramatically.  The average
revenue per minute of AT&T’s switched services has been reduced by 62% between 1984
and 1996.  Figure 2 shows the decline of average gross revenue per minute for AT&T and
the average revenue per minute net of access.7  AT&T was declared “non-dominant” in
                                                                                                                   
market by the end of 1998.  Technological advances in the electronics of fiberoptic transmission have
multiplied the transmission capacity of long distance networks.
7 Source: Hubbard and Lehr (1998).
8the long distance market by the FCC in 1995. 8   Most economists agree that presently the
long distance market is ffectively competitive.9
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Figure 2
A long distance phone call is carried by the local telephone companies of the place
it originates and the place it terminates, and only in its long distance part by a  lo g
distance company.  Thus, “originating access” and “terminating access” are provided by
local exchange carriers to long distance companies and are essential bottleneck inputs for
                                         
8 See Federal Communications Commission (1995).
9 The claim of tacit collusion in the long distance proposed by MacAvoy (1995) and others has
been effectively rebutted by Bernheim and Willig (1997), Hall (1997), Hubbard and Lehr (1994), and
Mayo (1996).  See also MCI (1997).
9long distance service.  Origination and termination of calls are extremely lucrative
services.  Terminating access has an average total cost (in most locations) of $0.002 per
minute.  Its regulated prices vary.  A typical price is $0.032 per minute, charged by
NYNEX.  Such pricing implies a profit rate of 1500%.10  Access charges reform is one of
the key demands of the pro-competitive forces in the current deregulation process.
Local telephone companies that came out of the Bell System (Regional Bell
Operating Companies, “RBOCs”) actively petitioned the U.S. Congress to be allowed to
enter the long distance market, from which they were excluded by the MFJ.  The MFJ
prevented RBOCs from participation in long distance because of the anticompetitive
consequences that this would have for competition in long distance.11
The great success of competition in long distance allowed US Congress to appear
“balanced” in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 by establishing competition in local
telephony, while allowing RBOCs into long distance after they meet certain conditions.
However, the transition of local markets to effective competition will not be as easy or as
quick as in the long distance markets.  This is because of the nature of the product and the
associated economics.
Many telecommunications companies are presently trying to be in as many markets
as possible so that they can bundle the various products.  Companies believe that
consumers are willing to pay more for bundled services for which the consumer receives a
                                         
10 Termination pricing varies.  Pacific Bell, under pressure from the Calif rnia Public Utilities
Commission, now has an access charge of $0.016 per minute, giving it a profit rate of 700%.
11 The anticompetitive effects would arise because of the monopoly control by an RBOC of essential
“bottleneck” inputs for long distance services, such as terminating access of phone calls to customers that
live in the local companies to long distance companies, and are essential bottleneck inputs for long
distance service.
10
single bill.  Bundling also discourages consumers from migrating to competitors, who may
not offer the complete collection of services, so consumer “churn” is xpected to be
reduced.
4. Entry in Local Services as Envisioned by the Act
Currently, the “last mile” of the telecommunications network that is closest to the
consumer (the “local loop”) remains a bottleneck controlled by an incumbent local
exchange carrier (“ILEC”), a Regional Bell Operating Company, GTE, or a smaller
independent.  The Telecommunications Act of 1996 boldly attempts to introduce
competition in this last bottleneck, and in all parts of the local exchange market, while
preserving the effective competition that has developed in the long distance market.
Before competition takes hold, the Act attempts to create conditions that imitate
competition in the local exchange.
With present technology, entry in the local exchange is inherently more difficult
than entry in long distance.  Among the factors that contribute to that are:
(i)  High capital requirements.  Building the “local loop” that connects the customer to
the network requires much more capital per customer than creating a long distance
network.
(ii)  Need for  significant cooperation with the local telephone company that the entrant
plans to compete against.
(iii)  Location-specific constraints.  While many elements/components of the long
distance network are moveable, much of the investment in the local exchange has
to be made at specific locations.
11
To facilitate entry in the local exchange, the Act imposes mandatory
interconnection, unbundling, and number portability.  In particular, Section 251(c)(2)
mandates
“interconnection,
(B) at any technically feasible point
(C)  that is at least equal in quality to that provided by the local exchange
carrier to itself or to any subsidiary, affiliate, or any other party to which
the carrier provides interconnection; and
(D) on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
agreement and the requirements of this section and section 252.”
Section 251(c)(3) mandates unbundling, that is, offering for sale network elements
at “rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.”  To
implement interconnection and unbundling, an incumbent is required to allow for physical
collocation of equipment at its premises [251(c)(6)].  Moreover, all companies have the
duty to provide number portability [251(b)(2)], so that consumers can keep their phone
numbers if they change local service provider.
The Act introduces two novel ways of entry, besides entry through the installation
of own facilities.  The first way allows entry in the retailing part of the telecommunications
business by requiring incumbent local exchange carriers (“ILECs”) to sell at wholesale
prices to entrants any retail service that they offer.  Such entry is essentially limited to the
retailing part of the market.12
                                         
12 The Act states that prices for resold wholesale services will be set as follows: “a State
commission shall determine wholesale rates on the basis of retail rates charged to subscribers for the
telecommunications service requested, excluding the portion thereof attributable to any marketing, billing,
collection, and other costs that will be avoided by the local exchange carrier.” [252(d)(3)]  Notice that,
even if all avoided costs are appropriately identified and deducted from final prices, the ILEC is still able
to collect the pre-entry retail profit from resold wholesale services.
12
4.1 Entry Through Leasing of Unbundled Network Elements
The second and most significant novel way of entry introduced by the Act is
through leasing of unbundled network elements from incumbents.  In particular, the Act
requires that ILECs (i) unbundle their networks; and (ii) that they offer for lease to
entrants network components (unbundled network elements, “UNEs”) “at cost plus
reasonable profit.”13  Thus, the Act envisions the telecommunications network as a
decentralized network of interconnected networks.
Entry through leasing of unbundled network elements would be uneconomical
unless prices for the leased elements were set at appropriate prices that imitate competitive
prices.  The Act orders:
Pricing of interconnection or unbundled network elements [252(d)(1)]
“(A) shall be
(i) based on the cost (determined without reference to a rate-of-return
or other rate-based proceeding) of providing the interconnection or
network element (whichever is applicable), and
(ii) nondiscriminatory, and
(B) may include a reasonable profit.”
Appropriate pricing of unbundled network elements, tran port, and access
termination is crucially important for promoting effective competition.  The extent to and
the speed with which competition will develop depend critically on having prices for
unbundled network elements and services that ar  a close to efficient economic costs as
possible.  The more prices exceed efficient economic costs, the less entry there will be.
The less entry there is, the less likely it will be that effective competition will develop in
                                                                                                                   
13 The FCC and State Regulatory Commissions have interpreted these words to mean Total Element
Long Run Incremental Cost (“TELRIC”) which is the forward looking, long run, (minimized) economic
cost of an unbundled element and includes the competitive return on capital.
13
local exchange markets, and, if effective competition does develop, it will happen more
slowly.
There is only one cost measure that fulfills both the requirement of the 1996 Act
that the rates for unbundled network elements must be nondiscriminatory, and the need for
that requirement to apply not only to the rates charged to different entrants, but also
between the entrants and the incumbent.  That cost measure is the long-run
forward-looking economic cost, or Total Element Long Run Incremental Costs
(“TELRIC”). 
TELRIC is the sum of minimized costs paid for all inputs required to supply the
unbundled network element.  TELRIC has the following features: (1) it is a forward-looking
economic cost; (2) it is the least cost to provide the service; (3) it is a long run cost; (4) it is an
incremental cost; (5) it includes a competitive return on capital; (6) it excludes monopoly rents;
(7) it excludes cross subsidies of any kind; and (8) in general, it reflects cost differences among
geographic regions.
Using TELRIC as the basis for prices performs several functions which, in
combination, guarantee economic efficiency.  First, it gives the right signal to consumers
in making purchasing decisions among goods, because then these decisions are made on
the basis of what society must give up to supply these goods.  In other words, it achieves
allocative efficiency.  Second, such a price directs production to the most efficient, least-
cost suppliers, because these producers can offer the lowest prices.  In other words,  it
achieves productive efficiency.  Third, it gives the appropriate signal to firms in decisions
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of investment, entry, and exit, because firms make these decisions purely on the basis of
forward-looking costs.  In other words, it achieves dynamic efficiency.
4.2 Costs of Unbundled Network Elements Cannot be Based on Private
Opportunity Cost; the Irrelevance of ECPR and M-ECPR
Note that since pricing of leased unbundled network elements is based on cost, it
cannot be based on prices of the service for which the element is used, unless prices for all
final services are based on cost.  For example, the rent price of a switch cannot be
determined from the final price of the traffic it carries (local, long distance, or
international).  This implies that Act does not allow unbundled network elements to be
leased at a price equal to private opportunity cost, since private opportunity cost (i) is
based on the final price of the service for which the element is used; (ii) typically includes
the supernormal profits of the incumbent; and (iii) may include past inefficiencies reflected
in higher than efficient costs.  It follows that rules that base prices on private opportunity
cost, such as the efficient component pricing rule (“ECPR”) are contrary to the intent of
the Act to promote competition in all telecommunications markets.
The ECPR was first proposed by Willig (1979) and Baumol (1983).  In State
regulatory hearings during 1997, GTE proposed a variant of ECPR, named M-ECPR.
Consider a situation where a good or service  AB  is composed of two components, A
and  B, which, for simplicity, are assumed to be combined in a 1:1 ratio.  Assume further
that firm 1 is originally a monopolist for goods A and B, and good A is required for the
production of service  AB, that is, A  is a “bottleneck.”  In local exchange markets, the
bottleneck service A is termination access to the customers of the incumbent local
15
exchange carrier.  For simplicity, let the unit cost of component  A  be  cA, and the cost of
component  B  be  cB, while good  AB  is sold at price  pAB.  Now suppose that a new firm
(firm 2) enters the market for  B  and would like to produce service  AB.  The  ECPR sets
an “access fee,” or price, for component  A, to be paid by firm 2, equal to the pre-entry
(monopoly) price of final good AB  minus the cost of component  B, that is, at   pA,ECPR =
pAB - cB.  The ECPR access fee  pA  is thus equal to the cost of A, cA, plus the private
opportunity cost (i.e., profit) of the incumbent, (pAB - cA - cB), i.e., pA,ECPR = cA + (pAB - cA
- cB) = pAB - cB.  The inclusion of the incumbent’s private opportunity cost (profit) in the
access fee implies a perpetuation of inefficient pricing despite entry.
The ECPR was proposed as a way to insure prod ctive efficiency, i.e., that the
least cost technology is used in production.  The ECPR guarantees to the incumbent
monopolist its pre-entry profit margin no matter who produces the good (the incumbent or
the entrant).  Therefore, an entrant that has higher costs for B than the incumbent cannot
survive after paying the ECPR-implied fee to the incumbent.  This precludes inefficient
entry.
Although the ECPR has been proposed as a way to exclude entry in the
complementary good market by inefficient entrants, it can be used to exclude or
marginalize equally efficient or more efficient rivals when there are increasing returns to
scale.  The bottleneck monopolist may use the ECPR to establish high interconnection or
access charges that result in a restriction of the scale of operation of the rival in the
complementary market.  Given increasing returns to scale, the rival then operates at the
high end of its average cost curve.  Thus, the monopolist is able to raise the production
costs of its rival through the application of the ECPR.  This results in a competitive
16
disadvantage for the rival, as well as in higher prices for final services.  Consumers are
deprived of lower prices that would have resulted from competition if ECPR were not
applied, as well as of competitive choices.
Moreover, in attempting to achieve productive efficiency, the ECPR and related
rules force consumers to pay a terrible price in terms of unrealized price decreases and lost
consumers’ surplus that would have been realized if these rules were not imposed.
Application of the ECPR results in an allocative inefficiency.  Moreover, often the loss in
allocative efficiency that results from the use of the ECPR (or the M-ECPR) is much
larger than any potential gains in productive efficiency from its use.   This is proved in
Economides and White (1995, 1998).  Their argument is simple.  Use of the ECPR results
in an allocative efficiency (dead weight) loss whenever the original price was above cost.
If the entrant/rival is equally efficient as the incumbent, there is productive efficiency loss
due to entry, and therefore application of the ECPR results in a pure efficiency loss.  If the
entrant is productively inefficient, the productive efficiency loss due to entry has to be
balanced with the allocative inefficiency created by the ECPR.   Economides and White
(1995, 1998) show that, for a wide range of parameters, the allocative efficiency losses of
the application of ECPR are higher than the productive efficiency losses that would result
if an inefficient entrant entered when the ECPR was not applied.  Thus, in terms of total
efficiency, use of the M-ECPR and the ECPR is detrimental to social welfare and to
overall efficiency.
The fallacy of the proponents of the ECPR and the M-ECPR lies in confusing
social opportunity cost with private opportunity cost.  Social opportunity cost of a
resource reflects the present social cost of the resource and should be correctly included in
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a cost calculation.  Private opportunity cost is the benefit or cost to a private party of a
certain activity.  Private opportunity cost differs in general from social opportunity cost,
since private opportunity cost does not, in general, reflect the cost of resources to society,
which social opportunity cost does.
An example will be helpful to understand the difference.  Suppose that two
companies, X and Y are competing for the business of customer C, which is worth $C to
each of them.  Assume that X and Y are equally cost efficient in serving C.  If customer C
used to buy from X and now buys from Y, firm X’s private opportunity cost is $C.
However, the social opportunity cost of the switch of customer C from X to Y is exactly
zero, since society does not gain or lose from customer C’s change of carrier.  Essentially,
since firm X’s loss was firm Y’s gain, private opportunity costs and gains canceled each
other, and the social cost of customer C’s change of carrier is zero.
Prices based on social opportunity cost are efficient but prices based on private
opportunity cost are inefficient.  Economic theory teaches that, to achieve allocative,
productive, and dynamic  efficiency, social (rather than private) opportunity costs (and
benefits) should guide pricing decisions.  Private opportunity costs differ, in general, from
social opportunity costs. In the pricing of access to monopolized bottleneck facilities,
there is significant private benefit to the owner of a bottleneck facility in charging a high
price for access to the facility.  However, high prices of access would result in a significant
social loss because they result in prices of final services that are higher than the efficient
prices.  Therefore, an incumbent monopolist should not be compensated for its (private)
opportunity costs (that is, its lost profits) that result from entry of a rival.
Inefficiencies also arise from the application of the ECPR when the monopolist's
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costs are not well-known or not transparently observable.  The ECPR access fee to the
bottleneck facility is equal to the price of the final service minus the incumbent’s
incremental cost of the complementary component.  Thus, when the ECPR is applied, the
monopolist has an incentive to understate its incremental costs of the production of the
complementary component (i.e., the service where it faces competition) and then employ
the ECPR to levy an exclusionary access fee to its rival.  This results in higher incremental
costs even for a rival that is equally efficient or more efficient than the incumbent.  T us,
even equally efficient or more efficient rivals can be excluded.  In this case the ECPR and
the M-ECPR fail in their declared objective, which is to exclude only inefficient entrants.14
Even if the monopolist were constrained not to earn positive economic profits in
the bottleneck market, if its costs are not perfectly observed, it can claim that some
incremental costs of the complementary services are incremental costs of the bottleneck
service.  Lower incremental costs of the complementary component justify a higher charge
for the bottleneck under the ECPR.  Again, this higher charge will deter even those rivals
which are more efficient than the monopolist in the production of the complementary
component.
One of the fundamental properties of a competitive environment is free and
unencumbered entry.  Free entry drives the competitive process and leads markets to
                                         
14 For example, suppose the actual costs of the incumbent were $0.50 for component  A and $0.40
for component  B, and final service  AB  was originally sold at $1.20, with a profit of $0.30.  The ECPR
access fee for  A  is $0.80 (= 0.50 + 0.30 = 1.20 - 0.40).  If costs are unobservable from the outside, the
incumbent has an incentive to claim that the cost of its  B  component is lower (and consequently that its
original profit rate is higher).  For example, the incumbent can claim that the cost of  B  is $0.36, which is
10% lower than its actual cost of $0.40.  This results in a profit of $0.34 (= 1.20 - 0.50 - 0.36), and an
ECPR access fee of $0.84 (= 0.50 + 0.34 = 1.20 - 0.36).  Facing this access fee, entrants that are equally
efficient in the production of  B  as the incumbent, i.e., with cost of $0.40, are foreclosed from entering
since they can only sell  AB  at $1.24 (= 0.84 + 0.40), while the entrant still sells at $1.20.
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lower prices as well as efficient production.  On the other hand, the ECPR preserves the
market power of an incumbent monopolist.  It increases the costs of entrants in the good
that is complementary to the bottleneck by acting as an “entry tax,” i.e., an extra cost that
entrants have to pay to enter.  When the ECPR is applied, entrants face a smaller potential
profit margin (difference between consumers’ willingness to pay and cost).  Thus, the
ECPR diminishes entry and competition in the complementary goods market, and results
in higher prices for final services.
Starting from a situation of inefficiently high prices for final services, application of
the ECPR preserves these high prices by setting prices for intermediate goods at
inefficiently high levels.  Thus, competition is not allowed to take its course and drive
prices to competitive, efficient levels.  Application of the ECPR prevents the natural
tendency of the market to self-regulate itself through competition.
It is prohibitively complex and difficult to apply the ECPR in practice.  The ECPR
defines an access fee for the monopolized service of the incumbent that includes the
private opportunity cost to it resulting from entry in a complementary market.  In
telecommunications there are hundreds of goods/markets that are complementary to a
typical monopolized bottleneck such as the “local loop.”  These markets correspond to
various vertical services that LECs currently provide, as well as to various geographic
locations of intraLATA, long distance, and international destinations where calls
originating from that loop may terminate.  It is clear that these markets have different
prices and various price discrimination schedules are used.  Adoption of the ECPR
requires that a different access fee be determined for the same good or service, say access
to the local loop, depending on its use in combination with other goods and services.  This
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means hundreds of different ECPR-derived access fees for the same g od -- clearly an
unmanageable situation (as well as discriminatory).  Further, even if a regulatory agency is
able to untangle this chaotic situation and assign correctly the hundreds of ECPR-based
prices to the same bottleneck service or unbundled network element, it would be almost
certainly of no use.  In the presence of different prices for the same service, there are very
strong incentives for providers of complementary unbundled network elements and
services to rearrange their own pricing structure so as to arbitrage the price of the
monopolized element to a single price.  And, that price will have, in general, little
discernible relation to the hundreds of ECPR-based prices that the administrative agency
would have worked so hard to set.  In short, administratively, ECPR-based prices are
unworkable and unlikely to last.  It is much easier, as well as more efficient, to price
unbundled network elements without reference to private opportunity costs.
In its First Report and Order (FCC (1996)), the FCC ruled that the ECPR was not
appropriate for setting prices for unbundled network elements.  In many S ate regulatory
hearings on the implementations of the Act, GTE proposed a variant of ECPR, named M-
ECPR.  The M-ECPR suffers from the same problems as the ECPR and was correctly
uniformly rejected by State regulatory commissions.  The lack of validity of the ECPR and
of related rules is discussed in more detail in Economides (1998c), Economides and White
(1995) and Economides and White (1998).
4.3 Implementation of the Act’s Provisions on Entry Through Leasing of UNEs
Many firms, including the large interexchange carriers AT&T and MCI, attempted
to enter the market through “arbitration” agreements with ILECs under the supervision of
State Regulatory Commissions, according to the procedure outlined by the Act.  The
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arbitration process proved to be extremely long and difficult, with continuous legal
obstacles and appeals raised by the ILECs.  To this date (March 1998), more than two
years after the signing of the Act by President Clinton, there has been very little progress
in the implementation of the Act.  No State has completed the implementation of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.  Only 15 of the 50 States have adopted permanent
prices for unbundled network elements.15
Two other significant obstacles have arisen in the path of entry in the local market.
The first is the insistence of ILECs to collect significant non-recurring costs in the leasing
of unbundled network elements and in reselling wholesale services to entrants.  The ILECs
demanded significant non-recurring costs that were often many times higher than the level
that ILECs change their customers for similar changes in service.  Often these costs were
exaggerated because they were not calculated using the most efficient production
technology.  This leads to the second obstacle.  Costs of customer migration or of UNE
leasing were calculated on the basis of manual one-by-one transactions.  ILECs have been
extremely slow to implement electronic interfaces (similar to the ones used to migrate long
distance customers) that would allow for efficient transfer of customers from themselves
to competing carriers.  Moreover, ILECs have demanded that entrants pay for all
transition costs.  To maximize efficiency, transition costs to create electronic interfaces or
other such infrastructure should be raised from the whole industry in a competitively-
                                         
15 These were Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana,
New Jersey, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin.  Of the states that
have adopted permanent prices for UNEs, 5 are in the Bell Atlantic/ NYNEX territory (Delaware, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania).  Also note that only 4 states have adopted permanent
rates in arbitrations of entrants with GTE (Florida, Montana, Oregon, and Texas).  For more details see
Hubbard and Lehr (1998).
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neutral manner.  This is because such transition costs are caused by the 1996 Act (rather
than by a particular competitor).  Unfortunately, to this date in no State have ILECs
completed the setup and implementation of such electronic interfaces.
In the absence of final prices, given the uncertainty of the various legal
proceedings, and without final resolution on the issues of non-recurring costs and of the
electronic interface for switching local service customers across carriers, entry in the local
exchange through leasing of unbundled network elements has been minimal.  Moreover,
entry in the retailing part of the business through total service resale has also been
minimal, since the wholesale discounts have been small.
5. Entry of RBOCs in Long Distance Service
RBOCs (Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, SBC and USWest) have 89% of
telephone access lines nationwide.  Most of the remainder belongs to GTE.  Competitive
access providers (who did not hold a franchise monopoly) have less than 1% of residential
access lines nationwide.  Besides providing access to long distance companies, local
exchange carriers also provide lucrative “custom local exchange services” (CLASS), such
as call waiting, conference calling, and automatic number identification.  Basic local
service provided by LECs is considered not to be particularly profitable.
The MFJ which sealed the breakup of AT&T did not allow entry of RBOCs in
long distance.  The reason for this was that each RBOC was a monopolist in its own
region, and there was a clear danger that, if allowed in long distance, the RBOC could
engage in a number of anti-competitive actions against its long distance competitors.  I
discuss such anti-competitive actions in detail below.
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The 1996 Act keeps the precaution of the MFJ regarding entry of RBOCs in long
distance.  Thus, the 1996 Act does not allow entry of RBOCs in long distance until a list
of requirements has been met,16 and the petitioner has proved that its proposal is in the
public interest.  These requirements can be met only when the market for local
telecommunications services becomes sufficiently competitive.  If the local market is not
competitive when an incumbent LEC monopolist enters into long distance, the LEC can
                                         
16 The “checklist” conditions are [section 271(c)(2)(B)]:
“(i) Interconnection in accordance with the requirements of sections 251(c)(2) and
252(d)(1).
(ii) Nondiscriminatory access to network elements in accordance with the requirements of
sections 251(c)(3) and 252(d)(1).
(iii) Nondiscriminatory access to the poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way owned or
controlled by the Bell operating company at just and reasonable rates in accordance with
the requirements of section 224.
(iv) Local loop transmission from the central office to the customer's premises, unbundled
from local switching or other services.
(v) Local transport from the trunk side of a wireline local exchange carrier switch
unbundled from switching or other services.
(vi) Local switching unbundled from transport, local loop transmission, or other services.
(vii) Nondiscriminatory access to--
(I) 911 and E911 services;
(II) directory assistance services to allow the other carrier's customers to obtain
telephone numbers; and
(III) operator call completion services.
(viii) White pages directory listings for customers of the other carrier's telephone exchange
service.
(ix) Until the date by which telecommunications numbering administration guidelines, plan,
or rules are established, nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers for assignment
to the other carrier's telephone exchange service customers. After that date, compliance
with such guidelines, plan, or rules.
(x) Nondiscriminatory access to databases and associated signaling necessary for call
routing and completion.
(xi) Until the date by which the Commission issues regulations pursuant to section 251 to
require number portability, interim telecommunications number portability through
remote call forwarding, direct inward dialing trunks, or other comparable arrangements,
with as little impairment of functioning, quality, reliability, and convenience as possible.
After that date, full compliance with such regulations.
(xii) Nondiscriminatory access to such services or information as are necessary to allow the
requesting carrier to implement local dialing parity in accordance with the requirements
of section 251(b)(3).
(xiii) Reciprocal compensation arrangements in accordance with the requirements of section
252(d)(2).
(xiv) Telecommunications services are available for resale in accordance with the
requirements of sections 251(c)(4) and 252(d)(3).”
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leverage its monopoly power to disadvantage its long distance rivals by increasing their
costs in various ways, and by discriminating against them in its pricing.17  The 1996 Act
provides that even if all these conditions are met, the entry of RBOCs into long distance
must also be in the public interest.  This implies that there is a significant hurdle for
RBOCs’ entry in long distance which may be more difficult to overcome than the
fulfillment of the above checklist.
In allowing entry of local exchange carriers into the  long distance market, the Act
tries not to endanger competition that has developed in long distance by premature entry
of  RBOCs in the long distance market.  However, on this issue, the Act’s provisions
guarding against premature entry may be insufficient.  Hence, to guard against anti-
competitive consequences of premature entry of RBOCs in long distance there is a need of
a deeper analysis of the consequences of such entry on competition and on consumers’
and social welfare.
Once it starts providing long distance service, an ILEC has the incentive and ability
to decrease competition in local and local exchange markets through the following actions:
· Cross-subsidization of long distance service from local service revenues.
· The imposition of a vertical price squeezes and other forms of price
discrimination on long distance carriers.
· Non-price discrimination (“raising rivals’ costs”), resulting in lower quality,
higher costs, and delays for unaffiliated long distance carriers.
· Bundling of local and long distance services before local competition has a
                                                                                                                   
17 See Economides (1998a,b).
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chance to develop.  Raising customer migration costs if a consumer subscribes
to more than one service.
· The selective use of local and long distance bundling schemes to target
customers who are more likely to switch to new local service carriers.
These anti-competitive concerns are accentuated by the ILEC’s dominant market
position in the local exchange market and the lack of incentive for the ILEC to avoid
engaging in anti-competitive activity once it has entered the interLATA market.
Cross-subsidization
The fact that an ILEC, if allowed to enter the interLATA market, would provide
local, intraLATA, and interLATA services raises a number of anti-competitive concerns.
The first anti-competitive concern is cross-subsidization.  Multiproduct firms with market
power in at least one product market are able to cross-subsidize some lines of business.
Such cross-subsidization allows a firm to build-up its brand name and customer base in the
subsidized line of business.  This is especially likely when a firm enters a new line of
business and it has strategic reasons to subsidize this particular line of business.  While
cross-subsidization is not necessarily a problem in effectively-competitive markets, its
presence in monopoly and near-monopoly markets has historically concerned regulators.
Cross-subsidization may take place in a variety of ways that harm consumers and potential
competitors.18,19
                                         
18 For example, the ILEC can use its brand name and its associated customer recognition to create a
significant strategic advantage for its long distance products.  It is also likely that the ILEC will provide
this advantage to its newly created division for free.  Thus, the ILEC will be benefiting from its position as
the incumbent provider of regulated services to market successfully its own competitive services.
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Vertical Price Squeeze
Other anti-competitive concerns also arise in the business conduct of a firm that
maintains (by itself or through its affiliates) a near monopoly over facilities that are used
by its competitors.  Beside the cross-subsidization concern mentioned above, a monopolist
who also sells a complementary service (by itself or through its affiliate) can impose a
vertical price squeeze on a competitor in the complementary product market.  This
happens because the monopolist controls the price of an input of its competitor in the
market for the complementary service.  For example, an ILEC controls the price of access
to the loop by an interexchange carrier.  If the ILEC, or its affiliate, is allowed to provide
interexchange services as well, it can continue to price access to its competitors
significantly above cost while pricing to itself at cost, and thereby squeeze IXC profit
margins.  The vertical price squeeze can be pushed all the way to the point where the
IXC’s profit margin becomes zero.  An ILEC that also sells toll services (itself or through
an affiliate) actually has the incentive to impose a vertical price squeeze on its competitors
in the interexchange market.
An ILEC’s use of a vertical price squeeze allows it or its affiliate to charge prices
for interexchange services that are significantly (and artificially) below the prices of its
rivals.  This is the fastest way for an ILEC (or its affiliate) to gain a significant share of the
                                                                                                                   
19 For example, in California, Pacific Bell has recently admitted that it has such plans.  In a re ent
CPUC hearing to consider the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (“CPCN”) (ee CPU
Docket No. 96-03-007) application of Pacific Bell Communications (a proposed subsidiary of Pacific
Telesis that would provide local and long distance services), it became clear that Pacific Bell
Communications was considering offering free basic service when the customer made toll calls of $50 per
month (see Transcript of December 16, Hearing of the California Public Utilities Commission, pp. 989-
990).  Such a plan is a clear attempt at cross-subsidization.
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IXC market.  Although some claim the contrary, it is in an ILEC’s interest to impose a
vertical price squeeze on its competitor in the interexchange market.  In the absence of
regulatory intervention, an ILEC's monopoly control of the access market yields
significant monopoly profits.  The existence of such high profit margins is what facilitates
the imposition of a vertical price squeeze.  As regulators implement the 1996 Act and new
facilities-based competitors enter the local exchange market, the market for access
services, unbundled network elements, and local exchange services will gradually become
more competitive.  This will make a vertical price squeeze more difficult to impose.  Thus,
from the point of view of the ILEC, now is the opportune moment to impose a vertical
price squeeze and gain significant market share in the interLATA market.
BellSouth New Zealand, a subsidiary of an RBOC, has clearly recognized the
incentive of an incumbent local exchange monopolist to engage in price and non-price
discrimination:
“A dominant incumbent can limit both the scale and scope of its competitors,
raising their costs and restricting their product offerings.  In addition, in can divert
or delay competition and innovation to protect its current revenues…”20
The Limited Role of Imputation
Although some claim that an ILEC's ability to impose a vertical price squeeze can
be eliminated by the proper use of imputation, this is not correct.  First, it is not clear that
ILECs will be held to an appropriate imputation standard.  Even if an ILEC, moreover, is
held to an imputation standard, imputation does not eliminate the possibility of a vertical
price squeeze.  An imputation rule constrains a dominant carrier to sell a service (or
                                         
20 BellSouth New Zealand, (1995), page 2.
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component of service) to competitors at the same price it sells to itself or its affiliate.
Even if properly administered -- a difficult task which would require perfect observability
of a number of costs and their proper allocation -- imputation imposes on a  ILEC or its
affiliate a price floor for interexchange service equal to the price of access plus the
incremental cost of any non-access inputs. When such an ILEC (or its affiliate) sets 
long distance price at that price floor, the ILEC (and, in the case of an affiliate, the parent
company that owns both the ILEC and the affiliate) still receives monopoly profits from
artificially-inflated access charges that an equally efficient IXC cannot receive.21
Moreover, besides the problems of observability to which I alluded above, it is not
difficult for the ILEC to create pricing schemes that, in effect, skirt the imputation rule.
Suppose that the ILEC sells both local and long distance services and an imputation rule is
in effect.  Then, the ILEC could easily skirt the imputation rule.  For example, the ILEC
could  offer a tariff that discounts the price of access in return for volume and time
commitments.  Although available to all, such an offer might be accepted only by the
ILEC's long distance division because its competitors, anticipating facilities-based
competition in the local exchange market, will not be willing to accept such volume and
time commitments to the ILEC.  Thus, in effect, the ILEC can “pay” a lower price for
access than do its competitors, even through it adheres to the letter (but not the spirit) of
the law on imputation.
A similar example, involving the price of wholesale local exchange service, could
be constructed to allow the ILEC affiliate to undercut other local exchange competitors.
                                         
21 In other words, an IXC unaffiliated with the ILEC encounters all of the access charges it pays as
a cost while the ILEC (or its affiliate) incurs some costs of access, but receives as profit the substantial
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Even more likely is a scenario in which the ILEC engages in both forms of veiled price
discrimination and is able to skirt imputation rules in both local exchange and interLATA
service.  In fact, in such a scenario, the skirting of the imputation rule could be rendered
practically invisible by the simple use of price bundling by the ILEC affiliate: a marketing
campaign of “one low price for both local and long distance” could make it virtually
impossible to detect the violation of any imputation rule (even a well-constructed one).
Non-price Discrimination: Raising Rivals’ Costs and Degrading Rivals’
Quality of Service
The ILEC can easily discriminate in the quality of interconnection that it provides
to competitors.  Moreover, such non-price discrimination would be difficult, if not
impossible, to detect, absent a requirement that the ILEC provide quality-measurement
information (concerning, for example, provisioning intervals, maintenance intervals, repair
times, etc.) regarding the services competitors purchase from it.
Non-price discrimination can occur in the way the ILEC provides both access and
local exchange services to its long distance division.  For example, in providing access
services that both the ILEC’s long distance affiliate and competing IXCs must purchase
from the ILEC, the ILEC could favor its affiliate by delaying provision of certain access
services to its long distance competitors.  Similarly, with respect to access trouble repair,
the ILEC could identify and prioritize the ILEC’s long distance service for restoration.
Without measures of access quality, neither the Commission nor the ILEC’s c mpetitors
would realize that such discrimination was occurring.  This problem may arise more
                                                                                                                   
difference between its access costs and its inflated access charges.  No amount of imputation can bridge
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acutely for new and innovative services that an IXC may want to introduce, where there
are no standard measures of quality and promptness for the ILEC’s provision of service.
The ILEC controls the operations support systems that handle the process of
moving a customer from the ILEC to a competitor in the local market.  By underinvesting
in such systems, the ILEC can make the transition to a competitor be full of delays,
confusion, and trouble.  In this process, not only is the reputation of the entrant tarnished,
but, the end-user customer also faces significant costs in making the transition from the
ILEC to a competitor.  By increasing customers' costs of switching carriers, the ILEC
keeps its customers captive, decreases the firm-specific price elasticity of demand (that
measures the change in a company's sales that are caused by a decrease in its prices), and
keeps the price of end-user services high.
Not only, then, is non-price discrimination feasible, but the ILEC also has
incentives to engage in it against its long distance division’s rivals.  Non-price
discrimination by the ILEC against the interexchange rivals of its long distance division
will raise the costs of these rivals and increase the relative competitiveness of the ILEC’s
long distance without harming the ILEC’s overall profits.  A detailed modeling of these
incentives can be found in Economides (1998a,b).22
Bundling: Raising “Customer Migration Costs”
ILECs will also be able to exercise its market power by offering discounts on
bundles of services.  Such a bundling scheme will make it more difficult for a customer to
                                                                                                                   
this gap between the cost profiles of the two firms.
22 See Bernheim and Willig (1996) for a description of the ways in which ILECs engage in such
practices.
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“migrate” from one service provider to another if the customer subscribes to more than
one service from the same provider.  Such bundling schemes will be much more effective
for a firm with near-monopoly power in one portion of the bundle, here the local service
market.
If a firm has significant market power, its competitors will have, even in the
absence of bundling by the dominant firm, a difficult time attracting customers.  The
ILEC’s position as the entrenched monopoly provider, which its long distance division will
capitalize on, will make it difficult for other firms to convince customers to switch carriers.
If the ILEC sells customers bundles of local and toll services, the willingness of customers
to switch will be that much less and the ILEC, as a whole, will be able to effectively lock-
in a significant portion of its customer base.  The direct effect will be a reduction of
competition from providers who sell only one component of the bundle, leading to an
overall effect of a reduction in competition.
The 1996 Act has not Reduced Market Power
The 1996 Act has not reduced or eliminated the market power of an ILEC in the
local market.  First, even with an unimpeded implementation of local exchange
competition, true facilities-based local exchange competition is still years away.  Until
facilities-based local exchange competition is at hand, the ILEC will continue to wield
significant market power.  Second, since the FCC issued its implementing regulations for
the 1996 Act on August 8, 1996, ILECs have aggressively pressed to overturn key
provisions of the FCC's regulations.
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The Lack of Incentive for Post-entry Cooperation
The 1996 Act imposes specific requirements that the ILEC has to fulfill before
entering the in-region interLATA market.  At present, an ILEC (and its affiliates) would
like to be as cooperative as possible, so that they pass the requirements and are certified to
provide interexchange service.  Once this is accomplished, the ILEC will no longer have
any incentive to cooperate with its long distance competitors.23  Wha ever cooperation
eventuates after certification will be a result of the particular restrictions imposed by State
and Federal Commissions and by the general business restrictions on anti-competitive
behavior.  And, no matter how fast facilities-based entry occurs in the local exchange
market –  and such entry may well be slow – ILECs will still dominate local exchange
markets for some time.
It Will be Difficult for Regulators to Deter Anti-Competitive Activities
I have already discussed the difficulties connected with the proper and effective
use of imputation in preventing price squeezes and other price discrimination.  Regulators
will also have difficulty in detecting and deterring non-price discrimination.  In the
emerging deregulated environment, companies are expected to introduce new and
innovative products and services.  The ILEC will be active in an array of markets with
                                         
23 The FCC recognized this concern in its First Report and Order on the implementation of the
1996 Telecommunications Act:  “We find that incumbent LECs have no economic incentive, independent
of the incentives set forth in sections 271 and 274 of the 1996 Act, to provide potential competitors with
opportunities to interconnect with and make use of the incumbent LEC's network and services, ” and “The
inequality of bargaining power between incumbents and new entrants militates in favor of rules that have
the effect of equalizing bargaining power in part because many new entrants seek to enter national or
regional markets.”  FCC First Report and Order,  CC Docket No. 95-185, (1996), at ¶ 55.
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varying degrees of regulatory oversight.  Under these circumstances, it will be very hard
for regulators to uncover cross-subsidization.
6. Universal Service
Traditionally, the United States has adopted a policy to maximize the
subscribership of the Public Switched Telecommunications Network (“PSTN”) commonly
called “Universal Service.”  This policy has significant economic effects.  Because
universal service requires that some consumers be provided with basic telephone services
below TSLRIC, from an efficiency standpoint, there is over-consumption of those
services.
Since most studies report very small price elasticities of demand for access, the
overconsumption effect may be small, and most of the distortion caused by Universal
Service may be a wealth transfer effect.  However, depending on how universal service is
structured and provided, a host of other inefficiencies may also be created.  It is important
to describe ways that will minimize (and hopefully eliminate) these additional
inefficiencies which could arise depending on the manner in which a universal service
mechanism is structured.
Historically, attaining the goal of the universal service has focused on keeping
basic local exchange telephone service rates low.  To achieve this goal, the funds required
to subsidize service were extracted from inter- and intra-LATA long distance service.
Thus, rates for carrier access and certain other services were set at artificially high levels
to provide implicit subsidies to support the universal service objective.
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The historical method of promoting subscribership raised subsidies through taxing
of traffic-sensitive services through the imposition of the federal, and, in some cases, a
State, Common Carrier Line Charges (“CCLCs”), and was based on implicit and hidden
subsidies.  The historical method of raising subsidies for universal service compares very
poorly with the economically efficient method for a number of reasons.  First, the
historical subsidy is not explicit.  Therefore, it is unclear who is subsidizing whom.  For
example, in the present regime, a rural customer who makes a significant amount of toll
calls in a high cost area may not be subsidized in net terms.  Second, the present
mechanism is not targeted to those subscribers who require the subsidy.  Instead, the LEC
receives the subsidy for serving all consumers regardless of their ability to pay the full
cost, even if they live in an area where costs do not exceed revenues.  Third, instead of
being funded broadly, the burden of universal service is borne by inter- and intra-LATA
toll users thereby introducing inefficiencies to the provision of those services.  Fourth, the
current system is not competitively neutral because the benefits of the current system inure
only to the incumbent LECs and not to any of their potential competitors.  This sys em not
only inhibits the introduction of competition in the local exchange (because the subsidies
flow to the incumbent LEC instead of to the carrier chosen by the consumer) but also may
bestow unwarranted benefits on the incumbent LEC to the extent the subsidies are inflated
above amounts necessary to provide basic universal service at TSLRIC.
The immediate impetus for change in universal service fund policies arises as a
result of the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  The Act introduces
fundamental changes in the structure of telecommunications markets in the United States.
The most important thrust of the Telecommunications Act is its goal of establishing
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competition in all telecommunications markets.  Competition generally drives prices closer
to cost and imposes a strict discipline.  As a result, and once competition takes hold, the
prior implicit method of subsidization would no longer be viable, and the Act explicitly
rejects such a process by requiring universal service support to be explicit, §254(e), and
by forbidding the continued use of universal service subsidies to cross-subsidize
competitively provided services, § 254(k).
The current system of implicit cross-subsidies not only distorts the price of toll
calls, but also adversely impacts competition in that market.  If the current system is
retained, an incumbent LEC that will be providing access services to a competitor will
have an unfair competitive advantage in the inter- and intra-LATA toll markets.  This is
because the incumbent LEC will be providing vertically-related services (access and toll)
and will bear only the true economic costs of access, while its competitor will be forced to
pay the above-cost rate currently embedded in the access charge.  To avoid this result,
regulatory commissions must ensure that the funding for universal service is achieved in a
manner that is both efficient and competitively neutral.
The 1996 Act aims to “preserve and advance universal service [254(b)].  This
means:
(1) High quality at low rates.
(2) Access to advanced services in all States.
(3) Access in rural and high cost areas at comparable prices to other areas.
(4) Supported by “equitable and nondiscriminatory contributions” by “all providers of
telecommunications services.”
(5) Specific and predictable mechanisms to raise the required funds.
36
(6) Access to advanced telecommunications services for schools, health care, and
libraries.
Regulatory policy which explicitly deviates from the market outcome in the market
for subscription creates a number of complex questions.  Among them are who will be
subsidized, by how much, by whom, and how will the money actually flow from the
subsidizers to the subsidized.  If these issues are not resolved in an efficient manner, there
will be resulting economic distortions (“secondary distortions”) that may be more
significant than their original cause.  For example, if the subsidy is extracted from
subscribers of a single service, demand for that service will necessarily be impacted in
ways which would not be consistent with the goals of the 1996 Act.  On the other hand,
an efficient solution to these questions can guarantee that no further distortions are
created by universal service, i.e., no distortions over and above the original distortion
created by the decision to maximize subscribership.
6.1 Principles of Economic Efficiency for Universal Service
Traditionally, universal service was supported by the very high price of access.
Once access reform has brought down access prices to cost, and competition in local
service has been well established, universal service will be supported by a new fund to be
created.  In the implementation of the 1996 Act, local competition and access reform
should be preconditions to establishing a new universal service fund for large ILECs.  If
such a fund is established before the local market has been effectively competitive and
before access reform has occurred, then the incumbents can sit back and effectively collect
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twice for the provision of the same service – once from high access fees and once from the
new universal service fund.
An economically efficient universal service fund should conform to the following
criteria:
1. All subsidies to promote universal service should be made explicit.
2. Universal service should be funded broadly.
3. Universal service subsidies should be targeted narrowly.
4. Universal service should be achieved in a competitively neutral fashion.
5. The existence and operation of any universal service fund should minimize
distortions to other telecommunications services.
6. Subsidized consumers should be served in the most efficient way possible.
These characteristics are embodied in the 1996 Act.  The 1996 Act specifies that
universal service subsidies should be made explicit (§ 254(e)), funded broadly (§ 254(d))
and achieved in a competitively neutral fashion (§254(b)).  This framework will minimize
to the maximum extent possible the problem of secondary distortions that I identified
earlier.  I discuss below each of the elements set forth above in turn.
Universal Service Funding Should be Explicit
To promote universal service in the most efficient manner, it is crucially important
that regulatory commissions have explicit knowledge of the extent of the subsidy, the
source(s) of the subsidies, the identity of the recipients of the subsidies, and the magnitude
of subsidies to be received by the recipients.  As the Joint Explanatory Statement
accompanying the Act makes clear, it is essential that a system of explicit payments
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replace the existing implicit support mechanisms.24  K owledge of the extent, sources,
recipients and magnitude of the subsidies is essential for regulatory commissions to be able
to evaluate the success of its universal service program.  Moreover, in the fast-evolving
telecommunications industry, regulators who have access to such information can more
easily make adjustments to the universal service program, if such adjustments are needed.
Universal Service Funding Should be Broadly Based
The 1996 Act explicitly requires that “All providers of telecommunications
services should make an equitable and nondiscriminatory contribution to the preservation
and advancement of universal service,”  § 254(b)(4).  This makes good economic sense.
Funding should be broadly based to minimize the size of the distortions in the prices of
other services.  For example, if all universal service funds were to be raised from the “call
waiting” service, this would cause an extreme upward distortion in the price of that
service and result in a lower subscribership to that service than would result if the price for
that service were set at TSLRIC.  Indeed, “taxing” only certain services and not all
services could inhibit universal service because a consumer’s decision to subscribe might
be based on more than just the cost of basic local exchange service.25  Thus, the current
system’s reliance on access charges to fund universal service may be counterproductive in
that it drives up the total cost of telephone service.  To maximize efficiency, subsidies
should not be hidden in traffic sensitive elements.
                                         
24 Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference at 130-31.
25 See Eriksson, Kaserman, and Mayo (1995).  The finding that higher long distance rates cause
reductions in household penetration rates is also found in Hausman, Tardiff, and Belinfante (1993).
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Universal Service Subsidies Should be Narrowly Targeted
As a general rule, universal service funds should be targeted to those customers
who, in the absence of a subsidy, would not have subscribed or would have dropped off
the public switched network.  In this manner, the size of the universal service fund and the
resulting distortions are minimized to the maximum extent possible.  By contrast,
untargeted universal service subsidies do not accomplish these objectives.  Indeed,
untargeted use of universal service funds results in a bigger fund than is actually required
which in turn creates larger distortions in the prices of other telecommunications services.
The Universal Service Program Should be Competitively Neutral
A competitively neutral p ogram is one that does not provide any competitor or
group of competitors with an advantage over other competitors in the provision of local
and other telecommunications services.  In the context of universal service, this means that
a subsidized consumer keeps the benefit of the subsidy if he switches to a different local
service provider.  It also means that the fund has to be administered by a neutral party that
does not have a competitive interest in the telecommunications marketplace.  Finally, it
means that the funds to support the program must be collected from as broad a base as
possible so that no individual service or group of services is unduly burdened.  It is best if
the subsidy is raised by an end-user surcharge on all retail revenues of telecommunications
services.26
                                                                                                                   
26 This requirement was explicitly recognized by the FCC in its 96-182 NPRM (April 19, 1996) at §
145, “Arguably, these principles can be interpreted as requiring competitively-neutral mechanisms for
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The Existence and Operation of any Universal Service Fund Should
Minimize Distortions to Other Telecommunications Services
The overall goal of telecommunications policy is to maximize efficiency through
competition.  Given this goal, any distortion created by the universal service fund, that
does not directly serve the goal of the universal service fund, should be kept to a
minimum.  A number of the features of an efficient universal service program, as described
earlier, help accomplish this goal.
Recipients of Universal Service Subsidies Should be Served in the Most
Efficient Way Possible
It is crucial to serve consumers as efficiently as possible, i.e., at the lowest possible
cost.  This guarantees that resources are not wasted in serving them, and minimizes the
total distortion necessary to accomplish the social objective of the universal service fund.
To ensure the efficient distribution of universal service support funds, the size of the
subsidy should be based on the total economic cost of providing local service -- i.e., the
TSLRIC of basic universal service.  Thus, the regulatorshould determine the TSLRIC of
providing basic universal service in each geographic region throughout the State.  The
subsidy required in each region should be calculated by comparing the TSLRIC of the
service to the current, affordable rate.  Where the TSLRIC of providing basic universal
service exceeds the affordable rate, the carrier providing the service should collect this
difference from the fund administrator.  Such a system is efficient because (1) it minimizes
the cost of the subsidy to society to the maximum extent possible without diminishing the
                                                                                                                   
recovering universal service support, rather than recovering such support through rates for inter-
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amount of subsidy that consumers receive; (2) it gives the incentive to the serving carrier
to provide local services at economic cost; and (3) i  does not allow a loca  service
provider to inflate its costs in order to increase the subsidy it receives from the universal
service fund.
Progress on the implementation of universal service reform has been very slow.
Up to now, no States have implemented a competitively-neutral universal service
mechanism.
7. Internet Telephony
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not legislate any framework for the most
revolutionary of all current innovations in telecommunications, Internet telephony, or
more precisely Internet Protocol (“IP”) telephony.  This is despite the fact that IP
telephony emerges as the favorite mode of operation of new telecommunications
networks, such as those built by Qwest and Level3, as well as the required conv rsion  of
traditional telecommunications networks, such as the one of AT&T.
Digitization of telecommunication services imposes price arbitrage on the bits of
information that are carried by the telecommunications network, thus leading to the
elimination of price discrimination between voice and data services.  Elimination of such
price discrimination can lead to dramatic reductions in the price of voice calls precipitating
significant changes in market structure.  These changes were first evident on the Internet,
a ubiquitous network of applications based on the TCP/IP protocol.  Internet-based
telecommunications are based on packet switching.  There are two modes of operation: (i)
                                                                                                                   
connection or unbundled network elements.”
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a time-delay mode in which there is a guarantee that system will do whatever it can to
deliver all packets; and (ii) a real-time mode, in which packets can in fact be lost without
possibility of recovery.
Many telecommunications services do not have a real time requirement, so
applications that “live” on the Internet can easily accommodate them.  For example, there
are currently a number of companies that provide facsimile services of the Internet, where
all or part of the transport of the fax takes place over the Internet.  Although the Internet
was not intended to be used in real-time telecommunications, despite the loss of packets,
presently telecommunications companies use the interne  to complete ordinary voice
telephone calls.  Voice telecommunications service started on the Internet as a computer
to computer call.  About three years ago, Internet telecommunications companies started
offering termination of calls on the public switched network.  In 1996, firms started
offering Internet calling that originated and terminated on the public switched network
(“PSTN”), i.e., from and to the regular customers’ phone appliances.  The last two
transitions became possible with the introduction of PSTN-Internet interfaces and
switches by Lucent and others.
Traditional telephony keeps a channel of fixed bandwidth open for the duration of
a call.  Internet calls are packet based.  Because transmission is based on packet transport,
IP telephony can utilize more efficiently bandwidth by varying in real time the amount of it
used by a call.  But, because IP telephony utilizes the real time mode of the Internet, there
is no guarantee that all the packets of a voice transmission will arrive to the destination.
Internet telephony providers use sophisticated voice sampling methods to decompose and
reconstitute voice so that packet losses do not make a significant audible difference.  Since
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such methods are by their nature imperfect, the quality and fidelity of an Internet call
depends crucially on the percentage of packets that are lost in transmission and transport.
This, in turn, depends, among other factors,  (i) on the allocation of Internet bandwidth
(pipeline) to the phone call; and (ii) on the number of times the message is transmitted.
Internet-based telecommunications services pose a serious threat to traditional
telecommunications services providers, especially long distance service ad international
service providers.  In the present US regulatory structure, a call originates from a
computer to an Internet service provider (“ISP”) (or terminates to a computer) is not
charged an “access charge” by the local exchange carrier.  This can lead to substantial
savings due to the enormously inflated access fees charged by LECs.
In response to the Internet telephony threat, on January 26, 1998, AT&T
announced that it will offer a new long distance service carried over the Internet and
intranet.  AT&T’s service offered at 7.5-9 cents per minute, will originate and terminate
on the public switched network (“PSTN”) and therefore will appear to customers like a
regular call; no computer will be required.  In November 1997, Deutsche Telecom (“DT”)
introduced Internet long distance service within Germany.  To compensate for the lower
quality of voice transmission, DT offers Internet long distance at 1/5 of its regular long
distance rates.  Internet telephony presently poses one of the most important challenges to
the telecommunications sector and its regulation.
8. Overseas Experience and Prospects
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Deregulation of telecommunications markets is a delicate affair that has to be done
correctly to increase efficiency and avoid disasters.  Deregulation of all markets without
regard to the features of each market in terms of monopoly power, viability of
competition, and interaction across markets can lead to disaster.  Early attempts to totally
deregulate telecommunications have been failures.
The primary example of failure of such total deregulation attempts is New Zealand.
New Zealand’s telecommunications market was deregulated starting in 1987.  The
incumbent state-owned telecommunications monopoly was privatized in 1990 as Telecom
New Zealand  (“TCNZ”).  TCNZ was bought by Bell Atlantic and Ameritech with the
commitment that they would reduce aggregate ownership to less than 50% by September
1993.  In July 1991 31% of the shares of TCNZ were floated in an international stock
offering, and, eventually, over 50% of TCNZ was publicly traded in the New Zealand
stock market and at the New York Stock Exchange as depository receipts.
New Zealand has opted for “light-handed regulation,” that is, a regulatory regime
that favors very little intervention.  New Zealand did not establish a regulatory body to
regulate and monitor the telecommunications sector.  Combined with a non-interventionist
competition law,27 light-handed regulation resulted in a very liberal regime in
                                         
27 The main regulatory instruments in New Zealand are
(i) The Commerce Act that generally prevents anti-competitive behavior;
(ii) The Disclosure Regulations that impose information disclosure on TCNZ as a dominant
incumbent telecommunications provider.
These instruments are reinforced by commitments that TCNZ has made in the course of being privatized.
These are
(i) The Kiwi share obligation u der which TCNZ committed not to increase prices of local service
to existing customers above the rate of inflation;
(ii) Various “undertakings,” i.e., obligations not to restrict competition that are stated in letters
exchanged between TCNZ and the New Zealand government in the process of privatization.
Although the Kiwi share obligations have been adhered to, the obligations arising from the
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telecommunications in New Zealand.  This allowed the newly privatized Telecom New
Zealand to act as a practically unrestrained monopolist in its dealings with competitors.
A number of companies entered the New Zealand telecommunications market.
Most notably, Clear entered the long distance market and Bell South New Zealand
entered the mobile market. 28  Both companies received interconnection agreement with
very favorable terms to TCNZ.
In 1991, Clear asked TCNZ for an interconnection agreement to provide local
service.  After a long legal battle, the case was decided by the Queen’s Privy Council that
acts as the Supreme Court of New Zealand.  The Privy Council decided in favor of TCNZ
and established that the ECPR was lawful in New Zealand.  This prompted TCNZ to set a
very high access termination price for any call that Clear would terminate in the TCNZ
network while insisting that TCNZ gets free termination access for any calls terminated to
the Clear network.  Since TCNZ has almost 100% of the residential customers, the
volume of calls to and from a rival local service provider would be very high.  Given the
price terms of the interconnection agreement, signed in 1996 after five years of
negotiations, the ability of a competitor to break even and survive as a local service
provider is questionable.
Despite complete deregulation, TCNZ still dominates all telecommunications
markets in New Zealand.  A number of suits by competitors for anti-competitive actions of
TCNZ are in courts, awaiting the very slow adjudication process.  The way that
deregulation was implemented in New Zealand failed to create an environment in which
                                                                                                                   
“undertakings” have not been adhered to.
28 Clear was partly owned by Bell Canada and MCI.  Current shareholders include British
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competition would thrive.  Most important was the failure to understand that the
incumbent monopolist in the local exchange could leverage its market power to foreclose
entrants in the local exchange, as well as to disadvantage competitors in the long distance
and international markets.
Europe, with the exception of Britain, has lagged behind in telecommunications
deregulation.  Deregulation and free entry in all markets was mandated by the European
Union starting from January 1, 1998.29  So far, not much facilities-based entry has
occurred.  Moreover, the position of the European Union on interconnection fees seems
ambiguous.  To a large extent, the European Union looks up to the United States for
guidance in telecommunications deregulation.  The delay in the implementation of the Act
has cast doubts in its application abroad.
Japan has announced a breakup of the incumbent local monopolist into two
geographically-separated local service subsidiaries (NTT-East and NTT-West), as well as
the creation of a long distance and global company, all subsidiaries of the NTT holding
company.  This reform is just beginning, and it is hard to predict its success.
Other parts of the world are generally lagging behind in telecommunications
reform, but are also swept by the very fast technical change in the sector.
9. Concluding Remarks
Over two years after the signing of the Act, many of its provisions have been
disputed in Court, and the Act’s implementation has been very slow and clouded with
                                                                                                                   
Telecom, MCI, Television New Zealand and Todd Corporation New Zealand.
29 Greece, Ireland, and Portugal received a 3 y ar extension of the deadline.
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significant uncertainty.  There has been minimal entry of new competitors in the local
exchange, both through leasing of unbundled network elements and through resale by
entrants of ILECs’ services.
The market structure in the telecommunications sector will depend crucially on the
resolution of the LECs legal challenges to the 1996 Telecommunications Act.30  These
challenges have derailed the implementation process of the Act and have increased
significantly the uncertainty in the telecommunications sector.  Long distance companies
have been unable to enter the local exchange markets by leasing unbundled network
elements (“UNEs”), since the arbitration process that started in April 1996 has resulted in
final prices in only a handful of States.  In the absence of entry in the local exchange
market as envisioned by the Act, the major long distance companies are buying companies
that give them some access to the local market.
AT&T has acquired TCG, which owns some local exchange infrastructure.  AT&T
is also merging with TCI and promises to convert the TCI cable access to an interactive
broadband, voice and data telephone link to residences.  TCI cable presently reaches 35%
of US households.  Without access to UNEs, to reach all residential customers, AT&T
would have to find another way to reach the remaining 65% of US households.  To do
this, AT&T has also announced, but not yet implemented, a wireless telepoint technology,
similar to cellular mobile technology, but only suitable to immobile or slow-moving
receivers.  Similarly, MCI is merging with Worldcom, which had just merged with Brooks
                                         
30 In one of the major challenges, GTE and a number of RBOCs appealed (among others) the FCC
(1996) rules on pricing guidelines to the 8th Circuit.  The plaintiffs won the appeal; the FCC appealed to
the Supreme Court, which accepted the case.  A fin l outcome is expected by the end of 1998.
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Fiber, which in turn also owns some infrastructure in local exchange markets.
There have also been a number of mergers among the local exchange carriers.
These mergers are motivated by a desire to increase the foothold of the merging
companies looking forward to the time that RBOCs will be allowed to provide long
distance service.31   Pacific Bell was acquired by SBC, and NYNEX by Bell Atlantic,
despite antitrust objections, in an attempt of the RBOCs to maximize their foothold,
looking forward to the time when they will be allowed to provide long distance service.
Recently, SBC announced its intention to buy Southern New England Telephone
(“SNET”) one of the few companies, which, as an independent (not part of AT&T at
divestiture), was not bound by MFJ restrictions and has already entered into long distance.
SBC has also announced that it will buy Ameritech.  Bell Atlantic has announced its
intention to buy GTE.  If all the local exchange carrier mergers pass antitrust and
regulatory scrutiny, the 8 large local exchange carriers of 1984 (7 RBOCs and GTE)
would be reduced to only 4: Bell Atlantic, Bell South, SBC, and US West.  The smaller
ones, Bell South and US West already feel the pressure, and have been widely reported to
be in merger/acquisition talks with a number of parties.
In summary, the very slow implementation of the 1996 Act has resulted in a series
of mergers in the telecommunications industry.
The intent of the 1996 Act was to promote competition and the public interest.  It
will be a significant failure of the US political, legal, and regulatory systems if the interests
of entrenched monopolists rather than the public interest as expressed by the US Congress
                                         
31 Recently, SBC announced its intention to buy Southern New England Telephone (“SNET”) one
of the few companies, which, as an independent (not part of AT&T at divestiture), was not bound by MFJ
restrictions and has already entered into long distance.
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dictate the future of the US telecommunications sector.  Unfortunately, the lack of
progress in the implementation of the 1996 Act during the last two years has been a
victory for the incumbent monopolists rather than of the US Congress.  If the present
trend continues, the intend of the 1996 Act to open all telecommunications markets to
competition will not become a reality.
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